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QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT OF FLAMMABLE   
REFRIGERANTS IN ROOM AIR CONDITIONERS 
 
Daniel Colbourne*, Terry J. Ritter 
Calor Gas Ltd, Athena Drive, Tachbrook Park, Warwick, UK.  





A number of safety standards and guidelines specify requirements for air-conditioning equipment that use 
flammable refrigerants. It is important that safety and technical requirements are based on sound scientific 
judgement in terms of the likelihood of potential risks occurring. This paper develops the risk assessment strategy by 
considering the following factors in detail, all of which may influence the possibility of ignition risk: mass of 
refrigerant, room size, typical ignition sources, leakage from refrigerant systems, failure unit components, building 
ventilation rates, build-up and decay of flammable concentrations and servicing. A risk model is developed using 
fault tree analysis, which incorporates these parameters to determine their effect on the risk of ignition occurring 






AC  room volume air changes (s-1) 
fA  floor area of room (m
2) 
C  mean concentration in air (kg.m-3) 
hC  concentration at height Ch  (kg.m
-3) 
iC  mean initial concentration (kg.m
-3) 
h  installation height of unit, height of release (m) 
Ch  height of concentration, hC  (m) 
effh  effective height of the leak (m) 
LFL  lower flammability limit of refrigerant (kg.m-3) 
M  refrigerant mass charge (kg) 
SOIN  no. of ‘live’ ignition source events per day (-) 
t  time following the development of the 
flammable concentration (s) 
aV&  volume flow of air (m3.s-1) 
 
P∆  imposed pressure across building (Pa) 
FCt∆  duration of flammable concentration (s) 
SOIt∆  duration of a ‘live’ ignition source (s) 
tFV −Φ  the frequency of a flammable-volume resulting 
from a leak (-) 
ignΦ  the probability of ignition (-) 
leakΦ  the probability of a leak (-) 
recogΦ  proportion untrained who recognise flammable 
refrigerant (-) 
refuseΦ  proportion of untrained who refuse to work (-) 
servΦ  frequency of “competent” servicing (-) 
SOIΦ  the frequency of a source of ignition in the 
environment (-) 






The objective of this work is to present a comprehensive risk assessment of the use of flammable refrigerants in 
air conditioning equipment, based on two different charge size calculation approaches. The purpose is to establish 
whether either of the approaches will contribute to an unacceptably high ignition risk probability. The quantified risk 
assessment (QRA) is conducted using a comprehensive risk model developed specifically for this purpose. The risks 
relate to indoor ignition only, and for the purposes of this publication, outdoor releases are not evaluated. The two 
charge size calculation methods are: (i) unaided dispersion of released refrigerant (Kataoka et al, 2000): 
 
fAhLFLM ⋅⋅⋅=
25.1)(5.2          (1) 
 
ii) Dispersion of released refrigerant aided by unit airflow (Colbourne and Butler, 2000): 
 
2.2)(25.0 ⋅⋅⋅= fALFLM           (2) 
 
The refrigerant mass according to eqn. (2) is only permitted when the air handler provides a minimum airflow, 
)225/( LFLMVa ⋅=& . Consequences of ignition have not been accounted for, but are currently being studied as part 
of an ongoing investigation. Risk frequencies are calculated according the variety of scenarios, including indoor 
units installed at low level (0.6m), medium level (1.2m) and high level (1.8m)m representing floor, window and wall 
units respectively. For each situation, both normal operation and servicing situations were evaluated. It was assumed 
that fixed equipment would not be put in storage whilst it is charged with refrigerant. Whilst the methodology can be 




RISK CALCULATION METHODOLOGY 
 
The general approach to risk assessment in this study is that of fault-tree analysis. Data for ignition sources, 
flammable volumes, failure scenarios, etc., have been collated in order to determine their respective frequencies. 
These frequencies  are evaluated in a fault-tree, providing overall risk for the sceanrio in question. The probability of 
ignition is based on three fundamental factors: i) presence of a potential source of ignition, ii) occurrence of a leak, 
and iii) flammable-volume resulting from that leak. The probability of ignition is found from the formula (eqn. 3) 
 
ΓΦ⋅Φ⋅Φ=Φ leakSOIign           (3) 
 
The frequency of the source of ignition is dependent upon the types of electrical equipment and flame-
producing devices within the environment, as well as their location and density within a specific room. Leak 
probabilities are generally based on empirical data, with the frequency of a flammable atmosphere being a function 
of the size of the leak and other environmental conditions. For each of the calculation methods, the ignition source 
frequency, indoor leaks, unit component failure and flammable volume frequency are calculated. Each frequency is 
estimated according to the nature of the installation in terms of location and operating mode. The various 
components that contribute to the frequencies are listed in Table 1. 
 





location Activity Leak type 











Normal operation (on) 



















Items that could be considered as potential sources of ignition have been identified for each location. Valid 
sources of ignition must meet the following criteria: minimum ignition energy: 20mJ and/or minimum surface 
temperature: 460°C. The frequency of the ignition source is obtained from the average time an ignition source and 






=Φ          (4) 
 
Most ignition sources are assumed ‘live’ for 5 seconds (e.g. light switch, cigarette lighter, etc), but other such as 
gas hobs will be continuous for a duration typical of their usage. The local positioning of the ignition source has also 
been accounted for, in terms of its height with respect to the height of the unit and the type of release. For example, 
a denser-than-air refrigerant release from a floor unit will not be ignited from a wall-switch. Further, ‘small’ and 
‘medium’ leak plumes disperse rapidly and are therefore only subject to ignition from the corresponding top, middle 
or lowest third of the room height. For most occupied spaces, the number of ignition sources is considered finite in 
relation to the room size; a large kitchen will not necessarily have twice as many cookers and kettles within it, as it 
doubles in floor area. The exception to this is office space, where the number of ignition sources (e.g. PCs) will 
increase proportionally with increasing floor space. It should also be noted that ignition sources within the appliance 
itself are not considered because safety standards already ensure they be eliminated.  
 
Due to space limitations, it is not possible to provide an in-depth discussion of the various individual ignition 
sources, but those that are considered applicable are listed here. Ignition sources in general occupied spaces: TV 
on/off, video on/off, games console on/off, hi-fi on/off, light switches, plug switches, cigarette lighting. In an office 
space: PC on/off, light switches, light bulbs (starter), plug switches, cigarette lighting. In a kitchen: gas hob, electric 
hob on/off, gas oven, electric oven on/off, cooker extract unit, gas boiler pilot, microwave, refrigerator, kettle on/off, 
washing machine, drying machine, light switches. All data is based on UK practice. 
 
Ignition sources for servicing depend on the competency of the technician. If a service person is trained in the 
use of flammable refrigerant handling, the probability of him using potential sources of ignition are greatly reduced, 
albeit not eliminated. There will also be situations where they must use a source of ignition to carry out the work, 
e.g. brazing. To determine what the frequency of ignition sources apply, a typical service pattern has been assumed, 
based on the data provided in Goetzler et al (1998). The duration of the visit taken is for 2.5 hours, with a visit 
occurring 0.1 times per year. Goetzler also estimates that 15% of service calls require brazing activities. It is 
assumed that a trained service engineer will not smoke when handling flammable refrigerants. Potential ignition 
sources for a trained technician arise from the brazing torch and torch sparker. For an untrained person they are 
additionally those arising recovery machine, vacuum pump, refrigerant detector (electrical), refrigerant detector 
(halide) and cigarette lighting. In order to establish the circumstances where trained and untrained service 
technicians are likely to work on equipment containing flammable refrigerants, a basic methodology has been 
devised. In the UK, it is estimated that 0.9 service technicians have received training for flammable refrigerant, 0.6 
of these have a familiarity with them since a large proportion of domestic refrigerators already use R600a. 0.4 of the 
untrained technicians are likely to refuse working on the refrigerant due to legal implications. Using eqn. (5), it is 
estimated that servΦ = 0.924 of units will be serviced by ‘competent’ service people and 0.076 will be serviced by 
those not considered competent. 
 ( ) refuserecogtrainedtrainedserv Φ⋅Φ⋅Φ−+Φ=Φ 1        (5) 
 
In summary, the frequency of sources of ignition considered here are detailed in Table 2 and are compared 
against the values used in other published QRAs for comparative purposes. 
 
Table 2: Estimated ignition source frequencies and comparisons with other QRAs 
 
Location This study HSE, 2000 Van Gerwen, 1995 Goetzler, 1998 
Kitchen 1.09x10-1 - - - 
General occupied space 2.49x10-2 1.0x10-4 per m2 8x10-3, 2x10-3 1.0x10-4 
Office (per m2) 1.41x10-4 - - - 










For refrigerant leakage, some useful data has been made available (Ayers, 2000), which provide a good 
indication of historical and future leakage values. For one-year period (Nov 1999 – Oct 2000) refrigerant leaks have 
been monitored at 410 supermarket installations throughout the UK that range in age from one to ten years. Leakage 
quantities, locations and frequencies were measured. The instrumentation took samples every 30 minutes and the 
sampling points were located throughout each installation at high-risk positions (15 sampling modules each with 
10+ sampling points) so that any refrigerant release from most locations would be observed. The size of the leaks 
was categorised as ‘small’, ‘medium’ and ‘catastrophic’ leaks. It should be noted that all measurements apply only 
to systems that are operating continuously, since none of these installations completely shut down. Out of the 108 
million samples, 1,533,239 leak events were measured; 1,435,473 were ‘small’, 86,882 were ‘medium’ and 10,884 
were ‘catastrophic’. 28.1% of the leaks were from components normally located indoors (e.g. expansion device, 
evaporator coils, etc) giving an indoor leak frequency of ‘small’ leaks of 3.74x10-3, 0.23x10-3 for ‘medium’ leaks 
and 28.1x10-6 for ‘catastrophic’ leaks. Data on installations of various ages has been considered, so the leak 
frequencies can be scaled up or down depending upon the age of the equipment considered.  
 
Leakage from equipment in off-cycle 
A system during standstill (i.e. compressor switched off) has a lower probability of having a catastrophic 
leakage since many of the mechanisms that cause leakage are not present, such as pressure changes, temperature 
changes and vibration. A recent report by AEA Technology (Guyoncourt & Fennell, 2000) considered mechanical 
and corrosion failure modes, of which very few were found to have the potential to cause a failure that could result 
in a gas release within the period required for a catastrophic leak. However, it was found that a combination of 
fatigue and stress corrosion cracking (SCC) under severe environmental conditions proceeds to a rapid failure. It 
was considered that stresses due to vibration from the compressor and thermal stresses generated during on and off 
periods could lead to fatigue failures in badly designed pipe-work or in cases where the tubing or unions have 
manufacturing defects. Failures would usually occur during the working period when the vibration stresses are 
highest, thus reducing the likelihood of it occurring in off-cycle. However, relaxation of a compressive thermal 
stress component after shut-down of the system could expose a pre-existing fatigue crack to a static tensile stress 
already present in the copper causing a sudden rupture of the pre-existing fatigue crack. 
 
The pre-requisites for SCC of phosphorous deoxidised copper (refrigeration pipe) are: a corrodent, (particularly 
ammonia), presence of water on the surface and tensile stress. Tensile stresses of sufficient magnitude may be 
present in the copper and water vapour will condense on the tube surface in the region of the expansion valve and 
the evaporator.  Ammonia could be generated for example by the bacterial decomposition of urine or other organic 
materials. Thus, the probability of a SCC failure can be evaluated. Taking into consideration all the factors 
necessary to cause such a failure, a frequency of 1x10-9 has been estimated, which is comparable to the historical 
figure of 3.0x10-8 advised by the Liquefied Petroleum Gas Association (LPGA, 2001) on catastrophic leaks from a 
LPG storage tank. This is considered to be an analogous situation since it is a static vessel that has a fixed holding 
charge and is only subject to minor internal pressure variation according to ambient conditions. Since these vessels 
are located outside they are normally subject to more rigorous conditions than those within a human occupied space. 
 
Leakage during servicing 
It is probable that the leakage rate in servicing is going to be greater than for normal operation since the service 
technician could be intentionally breaking in to the refrigerant containing circuit. With reference to Goetzler, the 
leak frequency leading to a significant release during servicing is recommended as 1.0x10-3, which is assumed 
“catastrophic”. In addition, the frequency of service calls requiring refrigerant handling is 0.15 to be applied to the 
total servicing risk. Taking the proportion of indoor leaks, the respective proportions are calculated. It is assumed 
that the probability of small and medium leaks is the same order of difference higher (about 10 times) when 
servicing than during normal operation: 2.90x10-2 for ‘small’, 1.79x10-3 for ‘medium’ and 2.18x10-4 for 
‘catastrophic’ leaks.  
 
It is also assumed that a leak could occur either whilst the unit is operating (e.g. during charging) or whilst 
switched off. On this basis, a 50% probability has been applied to account for the unit operating whilst a leak occurs, 
and similarly, a 50% probability of a leak occurring whilst not operating. 0.25 of refrigerant handling activities is 
conducted inside since systems are generally recovered and charged from the condensing unit. Also accounted for is 
the possibility of a release from a refrigerant cylinder. Experiments from liquid off-take cylinders indicate that 
approximately 0.15 kg/s are released when the valve is fully open, whilst it takes approximately 5 seconds for the 
service technician to correct this occurrence. This is considered constant regardless of the unit charge size. 
 
 
FLAMMABLE VOLUMES FROM REFRIGERANT RELEASE 
 
Since reliable data is available on leaks, the flammable volume-time (FV-t) – the duration that a volume of 
refrigerant within its flammable range exists for - can be used to determine the frequency that a flammable 
concentration will occur. For a particular release scenario, it is essential to be able to define the FV-t, since the 
simultaneous occurrence of a flammable cloud with a ‘live’ ignition source will leak to ignition. Each of the three 
leak categories described earlier were considered, and the FV-t estimated under according to leak type, mass flow, 
location of release, room volume, air movement and ventilation considerations. All releases have been assumed 
vapour releases since much of the data is only available for this situation. The method for determining the FV-t of a 
release will be different according to the type of the release. The frequency of the flammable concentration, tFV −Φ , 









        (6) 
 
Flammable volume-time of leak plumes 
In the case of a plume, the FV-t of the plume was estimated based on the geometry of the release. Low, medium 
and catastrophic leak data was used to estimate nominal release characteristics from a circular hole in pipework 
using conventional steady flow equations. The approach described by Cleaver et al (1994) was used to determine the 
magnitude of the flammable volumes generated from jets. The FV-t is then calculated from integrating the volume 
within the plume that corresponds to the region between the flammable limits of the refrigerant over the total release 
time. The FV-t of a plume is generally small, in the order of 0.5 – 1.5 m3.s for a ‘small’ leak and 15 – 35 m3.s for a 
‘medium’ leak, of 1kg. 
 
Catastrophic leaks 
There are three different situations where a flammable cloud occurs following a catastrophic release: (i) a cloud 
from a release of mass according to equation (1); (ii) a release mass according to equation (2) with minimum airflow 
in equation (3); (iii) a release mass according to equation (2) with no airflow. Equation (1) was derived on a constant 
FV-t basis, so all releases under situation (i) are 900 m3.s. A basic cloud-decay model, validated against data from 
previous experiments (Colbourne and Butler, 2000) was used for case (ii), and the output from this corresponded 
closely with the results of CFD modelling described by Kataoka et al (2000). For example, a 1kg release from 2m 
produced a FV-t of 120m3.s. The approach used to derive equation (1) is used to calculate the initial size of the 
flammable volume for case (iii). Eqn. (7) is used to estimate the height of the ‘flammable pool’ following a 


































hCAM       (7) 
 
The effective leak height, effh , is a function of the floor area and the leak height according to eqn. (8). 
 ( ))7/(ln37.0)(lnexp feff Ahh ⋅−=         (8) 
 
The flammable-volume is the product )( fC Ah ⋅ . Given that infiltration invariably exists, the flammable 
volume time is approximated using the decay equation over the flammable volume for the prescribed infiltration 
rate. The use of experimental data from an earlier set of experiments (Colbourne and Butler, 2000) was used to 
validate the use of eqn. (9). 
 
( )tACCtC i ⋅−⋅= exp)(           (9) 
 
The FV-t is therefore the product )( tAh fC ⋅⋅ , where t  is the time that UFLtCLFL ≤≤ )( . As an example, for 
a 1kg release for a floor unit the FV-t range from 120,000 m3.s for AC = 0.25 h-1, to 4,000m3.s for AC = 5 h-1. A 
catastrophic release from a wall unit range from 8,000 m3.s for AC = 0.25 h-1, to 300m3.s for AC = 5 h-1. 
 
Failure of unit components 
The use of certain unit components may contribute to an increased FV-t, since their failure may result in a lack 
of sufficient airflow in case (iii) above. These are: 
 
• Fan motors. Frequency of fan motor failures depends on a wide range of factors including working 
environment, type of motor and so on. Generally, precise data is not readily available. Data provided by one 
manufacturer states a fan/fan motor failure rate of two in 1000 per year. 
• Air flow. Filters and air ducts tend to get blocked which reduces airflow rate and therefore the effectiveness of 
the airflow. There is no data available to show the proportion of volume flow rate degradation with increased 
blocking of filters, which would be a function of time, dependent on the environment that the equipment is 
working. However, data has been found in Davies and Pearson (1999) for appliance flue blocking. This gives a 
value of 13% of flues blocked per annum, which is considered conservative for air conditioning equipment, but 
was employed here in absence of more specific data. 
• Control circuit. There is no available data on the failure of control circuits, but discussion with engineers 
involved in refrigeration controls indicate that a figure of 5% failure per year is reasonable.  
 
Ventilation effect 
The effects of ventilation are significant to the creation and dispersion of a flammable concentration of leaked 
refrigerant. More-importantly, they contribute to the flammable volume-time of a refrigerant release. On this basis it 
is important to determine statistical data on airflow rates for buildings. All buildings have a degree of air leakage, 
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Eqn 1, h=1.8m Eqn 2, h=1.8m Eqn 1, h=1.2m
Eqn 2, h=1.2m Eqn 1, h=0.6m Eqn 2, h=0.6m
Fig. 1: Results for units installed at different heights 
presence of flammable clouds and the subsequent dispersion of refrigerant. Statistical data on building leakage at an 
imposed pressure is available from certain sources. A collation of leakage data at an imposed pressure of 50 Pa 
(Orme et al, 1998) has been used to determine the typical variation in room air changes under a range of conditions. 
Within the UK, 3% of buildings have AC = 0-4 h-1 at 50Pa, 29% have AC = 5-9 h-1, 28% have AC = 10-14 h-1, 
13% have AC = 15-19 h-1 and 2% have AC = 25-30 h-1. To convert the air change rate due to the imposed pressure 
of 50 Pa to an air change rate based on real conditions, eqn. (10) was used. 
 
( )nPACAC 50/)50( ∆⋅=           (10) 
 
Where the index n  is generally 0.6 – 1.0 depending on the structure, and, P∆  is based on air pressure 
calculations for the conditions in question. Using the general approach for calculation of stack and wind-pressure 
(BS 5925), the variation in pressure across a building fabric for the range of yearly conditions was evaluated. The 
result is the proportion of time that occupancies have a specific air change rate due to natural ventilation. Based on 
UK data for a two-storey building in an urban area, the frequencies for infiltration rates - or proportion of time such 
air change rates are present – are: 0.086 for 0 ≤ AC  ≤ 0.5, 0.225 for 0.5 ≤ AC  ≤ 1.0, 0.432 for 1.0 ≤ AC  ≤ 2, 0.241 
for 2 ≤ AC  ≤ 5, 0.016 for 5 ≤ AC  ≤ 10. These frequencies were be used in the estimations of FV-t in eqn. (9), 





The results of the calculations for ignition frequencies are presented here. Firstly, it is useful to note the primary 
elements of the risk calculation; the sum of which provides the total overall risk. These primary elements are the 
ignition risks due to leakage, flammable volume and ignition under the conditions stated. Table 3 lists this data for a 
wall unit containing 1kg of R290 in an office space of 48m2 according to eqn. (2), with a 12 hour/day operating 
cycle.  
 
Table 3: Example of primary elements of total risk 
 
Element Normal operation Servicing 
Small leak plume 4.63x10-14 4.50x10-12 
Medium leak plume 2.66x10-13 1.27x10-10 
Catastrophic leak plume 1.99x10-12 1.93x10-10 
Catastrophic leak, unit on, floor 4.10x10-11 4.52x10-09 
Catastrophic leak, unit off, floor 6.15x10-15 4.52x10-09 
Catastrophic leak, unit on, safety controls fail 3.17x10-12 5.97x10-10 
Catastrophic leak, unit off, safety controls fail 3.60x10-15 4.52x10-09 
Leak from cylinder - 4.99x10-09 
Overall Risk 4.65x10-11 2.17x10-08 
 
In this example, the risks associated 
with small and medium sized leaks are 
negligible during normal operation. The 
effect of the plume resulting from a 
catastrophic leak makes a slight 
contribution, but the primary cause of 
the risk of ignition is the development 
of a floor-level flammable cloud when 
the unit is operating normally, and when 
the unit’s components fail. With the 
servicing scenario the situation is 
similar, where a catastrophic leak occurs 
and the unit is either on, off or off with 
the safety controls failed. Thus, the 
majority of the factors that contribute to 
the overall ignition risk of this 
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Eqn 1, h=1.8m Eqn 2, h=1.8m Eqn 1, h=1.2m
Eqn 2, h=1.2m Eqn 1, h=0.6m Eqn 2, h=0.6m
Figure 2: Results for servicing different units 
clouds at floor level and the effects of failure of safety critical controls. The difference in elemental risk is consistent 
across the range of charge size and installation scenarios investigated and compared. 
 
Normal operation 
The first set of results were generated from the risk model under “normal operation” mode, using refrigerant 
charges corresponding to eqn. (1) and (2) for floor areas ranging from 10m2 to 50m2. Figure 1 provides the results 
for units installed at heights 0.6m (floor), 1.2m (window) and 1.8m (wall). Since eqn (1) was developed specifically 
to maintain a constant FV-t, the ignition risk frequency remains constant regardless of installation height or charge 
amount. Conversely, charge sizes based on eqn (2) show a gradual increase with increase in both charge amount and 
reduction of installation height. As observed in other work, the flammable volume of a release increases in relation 
to room size due to loss of effectiveness in mixing, when the release is unaided. Thus, the increase in risk is due to 
the influence of component failure (i.e. loss of forced airflow). A release of a fixed mass from low level also results 
in less effective dispersion, again producing a greater FV-t with lower installation heights. However, due to the 
influence of aided dispersion when airflow is adequate, the FV-t is significantly reduced, ensuing lower overall risk 
than that provided by use of eqn. (1). The constant risk level of eqn. (1) is exceeded for larger ( M >0.8 kg) floor-
based units designed to eqn. (2), due to the combination of large charges and poor dispersion when forced airflow 
fails. Results in Fig. 1 are for an office space. Ignition within a general occupied space ranges from a similar value 
in a large room (50m2) to a ten-fold increase in a smaller room. Similarly, the risk within a kitchen is approximately 
three times greater in large areas, increased to around 30 times greater when the room is much smaller. These 
differences are approximately proportional to the ignition source frequency within the room in question.  
 
Servicing 
Generally the rating of the risk 
levels according to the design clauses, 
follow that of the normal operation 
scenario. The exception is that of 
equation (2), which indicates a low 
risk level for small floor areas rising 
to the risk level of the other clauses. 
The reason for this is that where the 
generation of high concentrations due 
to high charge sizes can occur, the 
safety system cannot necessarily be 
activated  
 
Note about assumptions 
Despite the objective of QRA 
being to present realistic predictions, 
lack of appropriate data necessitated 
certain assumptions. Assumed data or 
conditions were always worse case, and include: 
 
• Leak frequencies were from supermarket installations are higher than small hermetic units. 
• All catastrophic leaks are assumed 3½ minutes, whilst data shows most occur over a longer period, thus 
developing lower concentrations. 
• Leaks assumed to be vapour only when most are mixed phase, reducing FV-t. 
• Assumed that infiltration dilutes the leak rather than also mixing which would also reduce FV-t. 
• Effect of mixing due to thermal convection currents and human movement was neglected. 




In this study, a methodology for calculating the risks associated with the use of flammable refrigerants in air 
conditioning equipment is described and the results of the model are presented, which are based on UK conditions. 
In particular, the risk assessment has been used to determine the effect of design and construction of equipment 
according to the two approaches detailed as eqn. (1) and eqn. (2). No particular situation resulted in a significantly 
higher risk, although the use of eqn. (2) produces an escalation in risk towards higher charge sizes, whereas the risk 
when using eqn (1) is constant. This is to the detriment of very low charge sizes relative to the dimensions of the 
room. It should be noted that the presented frequencies are based on in-use and servicing modes, and that additional 
risks are present during manufacture, installation and decommissioning. 
 
In order to put the calculated risks into context, it is useful to compare them against other measures of 
“accepted” risk. Firstly, the UK Health and Safety Executive provide recommended values for risk (HSE, 2000). An 
intolerable risk of injury to individuals (not at work) is 1x10-5, and a negligible risk is 1x10-6. Another measure of 
risk is that of well-known events. For example, death by lightning strike is 7x10-7, death by a bee sting is 4x10-7 and 
death from an aeroplane crash is 1x10-7. In addition, there are existing fire risks from other household appliances. 
Based on statistical data on UK fires (Collier and Watson, 1997) the following frequencies are for fires from 
appliances in-use: refrigerators - 1.13x10-5; gas cookers - 8.71x10-4; electric cookers  - 8.25x10-4; gas central heating 
- 4.03x10-5; electric central heating - 1.01x10-4; washing machine - 1.63x10-4; television - 2.65x10-5. The lowest 
reported risks are for gas water heating (4.56x10-6) and audio/visual equipment (8.08x10-6). Whilst the fire risk 
associated with the audio/visual is probably due to electrical faults, a release of flammable gas is the usual cause of a 
fire from a heating appliance. In comparison, the maximum calculated ignition (only) risk for air conditioning 
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